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  ABSTRACT: Th e Pacifying Police Units, rolled out in Rio de Janeiro ahead of the 2016 
Summer Olympics, were part of a police intervention conceived to end the logic of war 
that characterized the city’s public security policies. As such, it adopted “soft ” strate-
gies of policing aimed at reducing violence and asserting state sovereignty in “pacifi ed” 
favelas. Drawing on a postcolonial framework of analysis, we argue that these favelas 
can be understood as sites for experiments in imperial statecraft , where a new set of 
socio-moral relations that we call police moralism were inscribed onto spaces and bod-
ies. Pacifi cation, in this context, means the reassertion of Brazil’s historical racial order. 
In our conclusion, we read the moral order implemented in the favelas as a prefi gura-
tion of President Jair Bolsonaro’s right-wing authoritarianism on a national scale.
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Th e Favela-Colony
Like that of most Brazilian megacities, Rio de Janeiro’s landscape is divided between areas com-
monly referred to as asfalto (lit. “asphalt”)—the “formal” city—and areas known as favelas (Fig-
ure 1). Favelas are oft en characterized by socioeconomic marginalization (Perlman 2004) such 
as poverty, informality of land use and lack of basic public services, and political disenfran-
chisement (Saborio and Spesny 2019; Snyder et. al. 2013). Importantly, the racial demographic 
of residents of the favelas and asfalto diff er greatly where the former exhibit a comparatively 
large proportion of the black and colored population (65.8 percent, according to the 2010 IBGE 
census) (Oliveira 2016). Th ese structural inequalities between favelas and asfalto are rooted in 
Brazil’s past as a plantation colony and slave state, symbolically encoding the favelas as black, 
savage spaces, in contrast to the civilized, white spaces of the asfalto in the social imagination 
of elites (Alves 2018; Vargas 2004). Th us, while Brazilians have generally sanctioned explicitly 
racist discourses, racial politics have also been integral to the functioning of Brazilian society 
more broadly (Cardoso 2014; Nascimento 1989).
In recent decades, the presence of armed drug traffi  ckers and paramilitary groups (known 
as milícias), along with the actions of the Military Police’s Special Operations Unit (Batalhão 
de Operações Policiais Especiais—BOPE), have further contributed to a sense of favelas as vio-
lent places or warzones. Spectacular police operations and widespread police brutality, includ-
ing kidnapping, torture, homicide, and collective punishment in the form of massacres against 
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favela populations, have been commonplace (Robb Larkins 2015). More recently, as part of Rio’s 
preparation to the 2016 Summer Olympics, the Pacifying Police Units (Unidades da Polícia 
Pacifi cadora—UPPs) have become a defi ning feature of state presence in the favelas. Th is has led 
scholars to argue that the asfalto/favela distinction is premised on diff erentiated technologies of 
power in operation by state agents, primarily police, across the urban landscape (see Alves 2018; 
Robb Larkins 2013, 2015).
Building on these observations and following the lead of Brazilian scholars such as Abdias 
do Nascimento (1989) characterizing state policies against Afro-Brazilians as genocidal, João 
Pacheco de Oliveira (2016) highlighting the continuities between colonial and contemporary 
practices of pacifi cation, and Jaime Amparo Alves (2018) demonstrating the characteristic 
anti-blackness of Brazilian urbanization, we argue that the favelas should be understood as a 
modern colonial formation. In what can be read as an elaboration of—and addition to—their 
nuanced and rich analyses, we use postcolonial theory to examine how authoritarian moral-
ism and urban security practices in the favelas provide a vantage point from which to analyze 
recent political developments in Brazil. We will approach the colony as a necropolitical forma-
tion in which the distinction between war and politics collapse, and where social order is cre-
ated through the administration of death and terror (Mbembe 2003). Further, in past decades, 
favelas with UPPs have acted as spaces for the experiment with racialized and gendered forms 
of imperial power. Crucially, such experimentation transcends the confi nes of favelas and trans-
forms the exercise of governmental powers at the imperial core, as well as shape dominant polit-
ical discourses around authority, race, gender, and the rule of law (see Leite 2017).
Paul Gilroy’s treatment of imperialism off ers additional insight into how we may connect 
the experiment in pacifi cation with the emergence of neofascist politics in Brazil. According 
to Gilroy (2004: 47), “the murderous enthusiasm for the proper racial ordering of the world” 
Figure 1: Street life in Complexo do Alemão, a group of favelas in the North Zone of Rio de Janeiro 
(© Tomas Salem)
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that broadly characterize colonial formations is constitutive of imperial political relations. Also 
drawing on Gilroy, we show that the UPP project serves as an entry point for mining the con-
fl ict at the core of the modern Brazilian state project: between democratizing forces and the 
reactionary affi  rmation of traditional hierarchies (see Braathen; Ystanes and Salem, this issue).1
To be clear: we approach the UPPs as a racialized experiment in statecraft  that prefi gures 
large-scale processes of transformation that have been accentuated with the presidency of Jair 
Bolsonaro. To make this argument, we fi rst trace policing history in Brazil and demonstrate how 
the UPPs, despite their stated objective of breaking the logic of war that characterizes policing in 
the favelas, were nonetheless subsumed to a militarized conception of policing as warfare with 
deep historical roots. Next, we describe the territorializing practices of pacifi cation as a form of 
colonial occupation and situate them within authoritarian state practices. Th ird, we highlight 
how this occupation also implied the mapping of a set of new moral relations in the favelas—
a process we describe as police moralism and which dovetails colonial “civilizing” missions. 
Finally, we discuss how police moralism is refl ected in national right-wing politics and political 
cosmologies and argue how the experiment with new policing practices at the UPPs can aid us 
in understanding the moral framework underpinning Bolsonarismo.
Importantly, international reporting on the UPPs and community policing more broadly 
have generally stressed their progressive and modern approach to policing. We want to chal-
lenge such readings and show how violence is not external to discourses of modernity but rather 
negotiated and reproduced, at the risk of reifying Brazilian institutions and society, as inherently 
violent. Further, our analysis of Brazilian politics is shaped by a focus on the state and its police 
forces and does not examine the important egalitarian potential of favela activism and grass-
roots mobilization like other contributions to this special section do (e.g., Braathen; Gilsing; 
Ystanes and Magalhães, this issue). Finally, as Northern scholars, we have worked to counter the 
potential representational violence of our ethnographic practice by extensively engaging with 
Brazilian scholars and by highlighting the role of transnational discourses of modernization in 
legitimizing state violence.
Th is article is the product of eight months of participant observation with the Military Police 
in Rio de Janeiro from December 2014 to July 2015 and a six-year collaboration between Tomas 
Salem and Bjørn Enge Bertelsen. Th e reform-oriented leadership of the Military Police at the 
time of fi eldwork gave Salem full institutional access to carry out a comparative research strat-
egy focused on three UPPs: Santa Marta, Mangueira, and Alemão (Figure 2), interviewing 
police offi  cers and supporting staff  across the institutional hierarchy (for a discussion on access, 
see Salem 2016). Th roughout the research, Salem experienced how his position as a male, Euro-
pean scholar worked almost as a protective shield and door opener that allowed him to carry 
out fi eldwork in high-risk situations and gain access to an almost all-male environment shaped 
by hypermasculine gender norms (see also Sørbøe; Ystanes and Salem, this issue). Th us, he was 
able to follow the police offi  cers in a broad range of situations, from patrol in the favelas, tacti-
cal training with the special units, community council meetings, proximity policing initiatives, 
public hearings and debates, and police social gatherings.
Colonial Pacifi cation and Policing-as-Warfare
In Brazil, the concept of “pacifi cation” was fi rst used to describe the sixteenth-century civilizing 
missions of the Portuguese settlers in the northeast. Pacifi cation implied, then, the joint eff orts 
of the military and the church in relocating indigenous populations to areas where they were 
placed under the tutelage of European missionaries. Th ere, they were baptized and primed for 
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exploitation as a labor force at the missions, plantations, and cities established by the colonists 
(Oliveira 2016). Following the arrival of the Portuguese royal court in Rio de Janeiro in 1808, 
advocates of a “soft er” approach to the “civilization” and “domestication” of native populations 
gained infl uence. Arguing that war should be avoided, these insisted that missionaries treat the 
natives well by persuading them with benefi ts and promoting mixed marriages to “whiten” the 
population. Military posts should, however, be kept close, as troops would be deployed into the 
forest to round up “wild indians” and bring them to the villages (Marinato 2008).
Th e European settlers also pursued “soft er” strategies vis-à-vis enslaved Afro-Brazilians, 
broadly circulating manuals with suggestions on how to repress revolts or increase the fertility 
of slaves. Th e manuals encouraged slave masters to reward women who gave birth with less 
work in order to increase fertility and show moderation when punishing their slaves to avoid 
revolts. To prevent escape attempts, they could allow slaves to keep pigs and chicken or to grow 
produce next to their shacks—keeping them occupied and “happy” and making them less prone 
to escape (Schwarcz 2019).
When the fi rst police institution in Brazil and precursor to Rio’s Military Police was founded 
in 1809, the year aft er the arrival of the imperial court, its logic refl ected such slaveholding prac-
tices, and its purpose was to protect the European elite and Portuguese royal family, who feared 
that black slaves—roughly half the population of Rio—would revolt. Tellingly, historical records 
from the fi rst decades of the 1800s register no arrests of white Europeans, as Rio’s police forces 
were conceived to protect the interests of the white, wealthy elite and to uphold a national order 
founded on slavery and racism (Holloway 1993). Consequently, throughout the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, policing served to protect elite interests, repress public protests, and keep 
the dispossessed in check—also following the abolition of slavery in 1888 (Mingardi 2015).
At the height of the Cold War from the mid-twentieth century onward, conservative, national 
elites supported the military government (1964–1985) in its eff orts to quash egalitarian ideol-
Figure 2: Complexo do Alemão in Rio’s northern suburbs (© Tomas Salem).
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ogies and the spread of socialism in Brazil. During these decades, military police departments 
were heavily infl uenced by the national security doctrine and became key players in the mili-
tary’s “dirty war “against political opponents and subversives, adopting counterinsurgency war-
fare practices from the United States and elsewhere (Cowan 2016). Torture and assassinations 
by the police became commonplace, while off -duty offi  cers formed death squads that meted out 
private justice for local businesses and killed alleged criminals—primarily in the suburbs and 
favelas of big cities like Rio (Misse 2010; Zaluar and Conceição 2007).
At the return of institutional democracy in 1985, war-oriented policing nonetheless prevailed 
through the war on drugs. By and large, it was the Military Police, in charge of street patrol, that 
entered into confl icts with the drug traffi  ckers in the favelas, and the BOPE represented the epit-
ome of militarized policing eff orts.2 In Rio, the newly conceived “war” targeted an old enemy 
of the Brazilian state: the young, black, and male favela resident. Th us, through the 1990s, the 
international war on drugs and the understandings of policing as warfare rooted in Brazil’s 
history transformed the favelas into de facto warzones in the imaginaries of Rio’s residents and 
police alike, while urban violence soared to unprecedented levels (Leite 2012).
Th e Pacifying Police Units
With clear reference to the notion of “pacifi cation” as a so-called civilizing process within the 
settler-colonial state, local authorities triumphantly announced the pacifi cation project in Janu-
ary 2009 as the solution to the city’s high levels of violence. Moreover, the establishment of the 
fi rst UPPs was conceived as a “break” with war-oriented forms of policing, to address security 
concerns ahead of the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, and to challenge Rio’s 
reputation as a violent city to attract international investments (see, e.g., Gaff ney 2010; Vargas 
2013). In line with the patrimonialism (i.e., the use of the state to serve the interests of the ruling 
elites) and corruption that has characterized the Brazilian state since its inception (see Schwarcz 
2019), most UPPs were established in favelas adjacent to Rio’s wealthiest neighborhoods, or in 
areas where Olympic stadiums were being planned and built (Figure 3). As such, the rolling 
out of the UPP structure conformed to what has been argued to be a form of “Olympic excep-
tionalism” (see Ystanes and Salem, this issue). In particular, such exceptionalism also entailed 
that private corporate interests reaped vast profi ts from the revalorization of areas close to the 
UPPs. Meanwhile, housing prices soared both within and around the pacifi ed favelas, eff ec-
tively expulsing the poorest residents to remote areas of the city (Freeman 2012; Ystanes and 
Magalhães, this issue).
While such market-driven expulsions were underway, pacifi cation was discursively presented 
both as a strategy for benefi cial urban development of the favelas and as a “soft er” policing 
approach, in contrast to BOPE’s brutality. Th e aim was for UPPs to drive away drug traffi  ckers 
that exercised territorial control, paving the way for public agencies and private business to 
“bridge the gap” between favela and asfalto. Reform-oriented police leaders saw the project as an 
opportunity to transform Rio’s Military Police into a modern and effi  cient citizen police through 
a local adaptation of the paradigm of community policing named “proximity policing,” focused 
on building trust between police and residents (Saborio 2014).3 In addition to funding from 
corporate donors, the UPP project received support from the federal government of President 
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Th e “soft ” rhetoric of prevention, community collaboration, human 
rights, and reduction of violence was believed to refl ect a socially inclusive Brazilian modernity 
better than the traditional, hyper-militarized forms of policing. Becoming a modern, preven-
tative police was, in this context, integral to becoming a globally oriented, modern nation, and 
the UPPs comprised an experiment in the exercise of soft  and managerial forms of state power 
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also implemented in other sectors, such as programs designed to combat poverty (e.g., Bolsa 
Família) (see Braathen, this issue). Th is understanding was shared by prominent fi gures within 
the police such as the chief of staff  of Rio’s Military Police in 2015, who in an interview with 
Salem explained that the police needed to change and that the collaboration with social scien-
tists was integral to this. He highlighted the experimental nature of the UPPs: “Th is is a labora-
tory, right? It’s like Chicago in the ’40s, that laboratory for social experiments.”
During fi eldwork in 2015, the outcome of the UPP experiment seemed uncertain, as the 
police had registered an increase in armed confrontations in pacifi ed favelas from mid-2013 
and onward. Th us, in early 2015, a new leadership assumed command of the Military Police, 
aiming to reassert territorial control in areas where the police faced armed resistance from drug 
traffi  ckers, intensify “soft ” policing eff orts to ensure local support, and bring the police reform 
“back on track.” However, while some politicians and reform-oriented police leaders might have 
aspired for a new, more democratic model of policing, their vision was not shared throughout 
the institution, where a pervasive masculinist culture and a conception of policing as warfare 
remained ingrained (Sørbøe, this issue).
Winning Allies
Th e proximity-policing approach adopted throughout the UPPs drew on trust-building and 
preventative policing strategies—including “social projects” (projetos sociais). Organized by the 
UPPs and varyingly implemented across favelas, these included sports and leisure activities, 
martial arts lessons, excursions, debutante balls, community meetings, confl ict mediation, and 
community events like neighborhood parties and Christmas and Easter celebrations. During 
Figure 3: Two of Rio’s pacifi ed favelas, Babilonia and Chapeu-Mangueira, 
located near the beach in Rio’s affl  uent South Zone (© Tomas Salem).
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Salem’s fi eldwork, the commander at one UPP established three “proximity teams” of three offi  -
cers each solely dedicated to social outreach and proximity policing aiming to develop relations 
of trust with residents. With this in mind, the offi  cers avoided the standard black uniform of the 
Military Police, donning instead custom-made white T-shirts with colorful details sown to the 
sleeves. “White symbolizes peace,” they explained, while black was perceived as more aggres-
sive—a refl ection of the racialized symbolic universe that permeates Brazilian society. Although 
they had been working in the proximity team for only one week, the sergeant said that it had 
already transformed his view on policing: he used to “like war” but was now entirely devoted to 
proximity policing.
Th e offi  cers invited Salem to join them on a visit to an area of the favela known to be calm, 
where the residents, according to them, were workers and, thus, “good people.” Upon arrival, 
they were greeted by the president of the local Residents Association (RA). Th e sergeant was in 
a good mood and eagerly engaged in conversation, while the group walked to an open area in 
the favela that served as a parking lot-cum-garbage-dump. Some kids were playing with their 
kites in between the cars and rubble. Th e offi  cers explained that they wanted to clean the square, 
move the cars, and turn it into a children’s playground (Figure 4).
While they were discussing this possibility with the RA president, a middle-aged woman 
approached then. She said the property belonged to her mother, who was now sick with Alz-
heimer’s, and that she was coadministering the lot with her six siblings. She then started nar-
rating her family history to the group at a fast and uninterrupted pace, and it soon became 
apparent that her mental health was deteriorated. Determined to see his plan through, the ser-
geant explained that the UPPs were there to attend to the needs of the community and help 
them “make improvements.” He told the woman that the lot would be of much better use if it 
was clean and without cars, making it into a playground. Aft er some conversation, the group, 
Figure 4: Police and local representatives inspecting the site for the future playground (© Tomas Salem).
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including the owner of the lot eventually agreed, and the offi  cers and president headed back 
toward the RA offi  ce.
Shortly aft er, the group left . Th ey had been away from the base for about an hour and decided 
to call it a day. Th e sergeant was very pleased with the visit, and enthusiastically exclaimed: “Did 
you see that? Th at’s how things should be done! I’ve already told [the residents] that I’ll organize 
a street party (forró), and I swear I will! Th at’s how you win allies!” He further explained that the 
key was to make the RA president depend on the police, rather than the other way around—a 
practice commonly attributed to the drug cartels’ way of exercising authority in the favelas 
through the RAs (see Braathen, this issue) but also an example of how personalized authority is 
exerted by UPP offi  cers.
Military Tutelage and Authoritarian Proximity
Th e scene just described indicates that in some aspects, proximity policing broke with tradi-
tional modes of policing in the favelas, centered on confrontations and war. However, it also 
shows such a shift  to be only partial, as the linchpin of proximity policing, the “social projects,” 
were primarily aimed at gaining acceptance, support, collaboration, and intelligence from res-
idents. Th is was made abundantly clear when one of the offi  cers explained how he would dis-
tribute baskets of food (intended for the poorest favela residents) to those he knew supplied the 
offi  cers with information. In the words of the sergeant, “social projects” were instrumental in 
“winning allies” in the war on drugs.
Similarly, one of the colonels and leaders of the Military Police refl ected on the importance of 
social actions at the UPPs as a way to acquire information on the whereabouts of criminals and 
weapons. “We have several social projects implemented by the police to improve the integration 
between the police [and the] community,” he said, adding that “Th e police need to conquer 
the citizen.” Th e police should develop partnerships, get close to the population, and transmit 
security and fi rmness if they wanted the community to open to them: “And without fi ring a shot 
we catch the marginal, we seize the gun, seize the drug, and then we start making a new police: 
a proximity police.”
Refl ecting such a strategy, offi  cers would oft en act as nexus between residents and other 
public services. For instance, if the sewers were clogged, the proximity team would notify the 
sewer company and have them unclog it. One offi  cer explained the logic of these actions: “Some 
people think that what we do isn’t real police work, but it is! Th e things we do prevent people 
from protesting, and when there are protests shots are oft en fi red, or at least tires are burnt 
on the streets.” His view expressed a common understanding within the Military Police: that 
social outreach projects eff ectively reduced the number of violent confrontations at the UPPs. 
Arguably, the substitution of reactive and confrontational forms of policing for preventative and 
intelligence-based forms of policing could be viewed as a shift  toward democratic and politically 
progressive forms of security governance. However, there is an uncanny parallel to the “soft ” 
forms of authoritarianism of Brazil’s past in the claim that the police’s “soft er” strategies pre-
vented situations that would have required reactive police actions.
Furthermore, as the material above also shows, an instrumental understanding of proxim-
ity policing was commonly framed within counterinsurgency doctrinal aims of winning the 
hearts and minds of the local population. Th erefore, proximity policing challenged neither the 
overall framework of policing as warfare nor Brazil’s historical experiments in authoritarian 
and necropolitical modes of governance. Instead, it reinforced a militarized understanding of 
policing, as proximity was seen to increase the effi  ciency of tactical (i.e., militarized) patrol 
practices (see also Bertelsen 2010; Menezes and Correa 2017). As one offi  cer in charge of prox-
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imity policing put it, “the UPPs are also carrying out a psychological war of winning over the 
population”—“also” implying in addition to the war on drugs. Such notions of psychological 
warfare are a common feature of counterinsurgency doctrine developed during the Cold War 
and are central to global contemporary war and security practices—on multiple levels (Burke 
2007; Buxton and Hayes 2016).
In addition to gaining local support, soft  or preventative practices of proximity policing 
comprised a strategy to prevent grassroots mobilization and collective resistance—oft en com-
bined with traditional, repressive action against the mobilization of favela residents (see, e.g., 
Braathen; Gilsing; Ystanes and Magalhães, this issue). Such was the case when UPP offi  cers in 
Alemão violently repressed a pacifi c demonstration against the pacifi cation project with tear-
gas and anti-riot armament in April 2015. Crucially, highlighting the contingency of practices 
aimed to improve police-resident relations and militarized logics, proximity policing implied 
a form of securitization whereby the gamut of public policies implemented in the favelas were 
re-signifi ed as security policies: fi xing a clogged sewer, providing ad hoc dental care, organizing 
a street party, or building a playground were primarily evaluated according to their use value in 
the war against drugs.
A fi nal eff ect of the police’s coordination of public services in the favelas was their establish-
ment of clientelist relationships with residents (see Muniz and Albernaz 2017), as expressed 
by the idea that the objective was to make the RA depend on the police or in the view of the 
diff erentiated distribution of food baskets. Th is has also been a feature of former iterations of 
“democratic” policing models in Rio’s favelas, more specifi cally the GPAE (Grupamento Polícial 
em Áreas Especiais) project—a precursor to the UPPs implemented in a handful of Rio’s favelas 
between 2002 and 2004 (Albernaz et al. 2007). At the GPAE, the police took on a similar func-
tion as public service providers, acting as mediators between residents and the public sector, 
eff ectively establishing a police tutelage in the favelas. In such instances, it is the police who 
determine the priorities of public service provisions and infrastructural improvements in the 
communities they control. Th us, despite attempts to create a modern and professional police 
force, proximity policing reproduced old patterns of military tutelage and clientelism common 
throughout Brazil and which serve to demobilize the grassroots activism of black communities 
(Braathen, this issue; Oliveira 2016).
Territorial Occupation
How proximity policing was implemented in pacifi ed favelas, and the meaning ascribed to these 
practices by offi  cers across the institutional hierarchy, attests to the pervasiveness of under-
standings of policing as warfare. Th e main priority of proximity policing was to maintain a 
permanent police presence within pacifi ed favelas to curtail the power of the drug traffi  ckers, 
specifi cally their capacity to stage attacks in areas surrounding these. Th us, through the UPPs, 
the police sought to assert state control in territories where they had previously been able to 
enter only in hyper-militarized operations coordinated by the special units. Th is emphasis on 
territorial control reveals that pacifi cation at its core was a militarized policing project—under-
lined also by the fact that at the base where the proximity teams were established, only nine out 
of three hundred offi  cers were exclusively dedicated to proximity policing, while the rest were 
engaged in militarized patrol practices and techniques of urban warfare (see Sørbøe, this issue; 
Vargas 2013).
As armed resistance in pacifi ed communities increased from 2013 onward, the loft y goals 
of social inclusion and urban development were increasingly downplayed, while the military-
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strategic goal of territorial occupation gained new precedence. Th us, in April 2015, following 
a surge in armed violence across pacifi ed favelas, local authorities publicly promised that the 
police would “reoccupy” these with support from special units. At UPPs with high levels of 
armed violence, the police built improvised trenches with sandbags and barrels, erected forti-
fi ed cabins to protect offi  cers from routine attacks from drug traffi  ckers, and even established 
nightly curfews during periods of increased tensions (Figure 5). Many UPPs received personnel 
support, and at some units, the commanders reduced the downtime that patrol offi  cers had 
between each shift  to increase the number on duty. As part of the strategy of reoccupation, 
police offi  cers patrolled en masse in daytime and at night remained stationed at military-
strategic points.
At one of the UPPs where Salem did fi eldwork, the police conveniently referred to this as 
“occupation shift ” (escala de ocupação), during which rows of police offi  cers, totaling around 
40, would move with stealth and speed through the narrow alleys and up the steep stairways of 
the favela (Figure 6). Silence and speed were important to keep the “element of surprise,” as they 
did not want to give traffi  ckers time to fl ee or to organize an ambush. Th e offi  cers in the front 
would carry military assault rifl es, which have high fi ring power and precision, but crucially, 
impose more respect than other weapons—an aspect also in line with how arms are related to in 
other violent contexts (Kivland 2018; Sørbøe, this issue). At exposed parts of the path, where the 
offi  cers were unable to retaliate if they came under fi re, they would cross one at a time, running 
with their heads down and their bodies in a hunched posture making themselves into as small 
targets as possible.
Th e bulk of favela social life normally unfolds on the streets, but during “occupation shift ,” 
these were unusually empty, and residents would move away when offi  cers passed. Some looked 
down, avoiding the gaze of the police; others would stop what they were doing and look at the 
offi  cers defi antly. From an outsider’s point of view, the offi  cers indeed seemed like an occupying 
Figure 5: Police entrenchment in Alemão, April 2015 (© Tomas Salem).
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force, a feeling refl ected in comments from police offi  cers who complained that residents were 
hostile and did not want them to be there. Th e group would gradually dwindle as small units of 
patrol offi  cers were stationed at their posts, their shift s lasting until 6 a.m. the next day. Accord-
ing to the offi  cers, the police presence at strategic points in the community was important to 
prevent local gang members from regaining control. Th ey explained that last month, a rival 
drug faction attempted to invade the favela and take control over local drug commercialization. 
Th e police had killed four alleged gang members and detained one.
At this and other UPPs, the heavy reliance on urban warfare tactics disrupted everyday life, 
seemingly turning the narrow streets and alleys into scenes that belonged to an action movie. 
Stops and frisks for drugs and weapons were arbitrarily conducted on those with a “wicked” out-
look (maldade) or a “suspicious attitude” (atitude de suspeito)—almost invariably young, male, 
and black. Additionally, hairstyle, dress, and appearance; former encounters with the police; 
suspected associations with the drug cartels; and attitudes of defi ance determined who were 
stopped. Th us, policing of racialized masculine hierarchies were integral to stops and frisks, for 
example, when offi  cers stopped a man aft er commenting that they thought his girlfriend was too 
good for him, or when offi  cers carried out humiliating genital searches on groups of adolescents 
whom they referred to as “bad elements.”
Importantly, stops and frisks were also used to assert police authority—rather than merely 
seizing guns or confi scating drugs. On one occasion, an offi  cer stopped a young boy without ID 
papers and asked him what he was doing out on the street. As the boy lisped and it was hard to 
understand his speech, this earned him a verbal reprimand and the accusation of lying. Aft er 
telling the offi  cer that he was 14 years old and lived in the neighborhood, the offi  cer brusquely 
told him to carry his ID with him at all times. He then proceeded to write down the boy’s 
name—allegedly to check if he had a criminal record. At other times, kids running down the 
Figure 6: Offi  cers donning “tactical formation” during a patrol round in Mangueira (© Tomas Salem).
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alleyway could be subjected to forceful interpellations by the police. According to the offi  cers, 
they could be running ahead to alert traffi  ckers that the police were coming.
At the UPPs, the deployment of a hyper-militarized counterinsurgency doctrine to gain 
local allies and collaborators, and the establishment of a police tutelage over the population 
through practices of proximity policing, only confi rmed the exceptionality of state authority 
as it was exercised in the favelas. Th at is, the pacifi cation project was broadly conceived as a 
policing initiative for the favelas, not for the asfalto, highlighting the racialized dimension of the 
UPPs. Such racial ordering of urban space was reaffi  rmed through “soft ” strategies and military 
tutelage asserted through pacifi cation but rarely acknowledged by police offi  cers. Instead, they 
described the main diff erence between people living in the favelas and asfalto as a cultural dif-
ference, where the distinction was the “respect” for police authority.
Police Moralism
We have now shown how the bulk of UPP policing activities was oriented toward the asser-
tion of territorial control and affi  rmation of police authority in pacifi ed favelas. Among police 
offi  cers, these actions were commonly justifi ed through a discourse of moral alterity that high-
lighted the civility of the police versus the savagery of favela residents. Th us, refl ecting the 
police’s concern with their own and other people’s morality, we suggest their practices express 
a widespread police moralism that echoes the dyad of military and church in colonial forms of 
pacifi cation. Th e police offi  cers, oft en living in Rio’s urban peripheries and many being mem-
bers of Pentecostal religious communities, frequently fl aunted their contempt for intellectuals, 
politicians, businessmen, and journalists, accusing the latter of being anti-police and pro-
criminal whenever they reported on police misconduct and corruption (which was quite oft en). 
However, their contempt for Rio’s elites did not translate into a defense of favela residents, who 
were generally held in equal disregard (see Machado 2017). Instead, they oft en described them-
selves as “social garbagemen” (lixeiros sociais) who had to deal with everything bad and rotten 
in Brazilian society.
In contrast to this perceived societal decadence, offi  cers viewed themselves as morally supe-
rior—a characteristic of military and police subjectivity common across the world (see, e.g., 
Albrecht and Kyed 2015). At the UPPs, however, manifestations of police moralism were in 
addition anchored in Pentecostal morality (Cunha 2018; Machado 2017) and the racism of 
colonial times, which doubly cast racialized others as easily corruptible and morally inferior 
people in need of salvation (see Vargas 2004). During colonial pacifi cation, the Brazilian indig-
enous population was subject to intense ideological surveillance from missionaries approaching 
them as morally weak and easily infl uenced by the devil (Marinato 2008). In the laic, modern 
Brazilian state, this role has increasingly been attributed to the military and police. Th is was 
clearly expressed during the dictatorship when the military took it upon themselves to protect 
the nation’s “moral order” from the threat of egalitarian, communist ideologies: fearing moral 
decay, they saw it as their duty to defend traditional hierarchies and respect for authority, con-
servative Christian family values, and gender and sexual traditionalism (Cowan 2016).
A similar dynamic was prevalent at the UPPs, where the police frequently described the 
perceived moral decadence of favela residents in the sexualized terms of indecency (sacanagem) 
and debauchery (libertinagem). Among patrol offi  cers, it was common to view their task as not 
only upholding the letter of the law, but also policing conservative gender norms and domesti-
cation of “uncivilized” favela residents. One offi  cer explained:
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Let’s say that one of the kids down the street wants to play music out loud that vindicates 
crime and debauchery . . . No law forbids people from playing music about promiscuity and 
homosexuality. So, what the offi  cer has to do to get the person to turn off  the music is to 
provoke a contempt of the law (desacato) to detain him. In the end, society loses. Th ey are 
talking about sex, but the police are not allowed to do its job. Society is doing what is wrong, 
believing that it’s right.
Here, the policing of behavior that challenged the conservative values of the offi  cers is brought 
to the fore. Similarly, and refl ecting nineteenth-century repression of black cultural expressions 
such as capoeira (Holloway 1989), the police prohibited funk parties in pacifi ed favelas. Being 
one of the most contested ordinances at the UPPs, many residents saw funk parties as a nui-
sance, while others viewed them as an idiosyncratic expression of favela sociality (Gilsing, this 
issue; Soares da Silva 2014). Th e authorities justifi ed the prohibition by claiming these violated 
noise regulations, while most offi  cers stressed that they were arenas for debauchery, illegal drug 
consumption, and the assertion of traffi  cker authority through the ostentatious display of weap-
ons. In the words of one UPP offi  cer:
You see that the music in Brazil is permissive with what we call the funk rappers (funkeros), 
letting them sing funk, vindicating drug traffi  cking, crime, violence, and presenting the traf-
fi ckers as heroes . . . So as long as the residents and the funk rappers keep spreading the idea 
that the traffi  cker is the hero, I will be the villain in the eyes of everybody, and nobody will 
help me catch those guys.
Among offi  cers, then, funk parties and funk music, especially the genre of proibidão (lit. “forbid-
den”), expressed the “culture of traffi  cking” that they thought to be common among favela resi-
dents (see Muniz and Albernaz 2017). Furthermore, the notion of a culture of traffi  cking allowed 
the police to draw on the colonial tropes of black savagery and white civility while maintaining an 
apparent colorblindness. For black police offi  cers, it meant presenting themselves as external to 
such a culture and to reject structural explanations of crime and poverty in favor of emphasizing 
the personal responsibility of the poor (see Milton 2007; O’Connor 2002). In the words of one 
black offi  cer who had himself grown up in poverty: “I didn’t grow up to be a thug, I didn’t grow 
up to be a traffi  cker.” Importantly, this proved to him that “not all black people are thieves.”
A similar logic was common among favela residents, many of whom strongly rejected socio-
logical explanations that connected crime and violence with poverty levels. A black housemaid 
from the favela where Salem lived, expressed this succinctly: “Th ere are many reasons why peo-
ple are violent, but poverty is not one of them: you can be poor, but an honest worker.” She 
then added: “Th e violence perpetrated by the poor is visible, but the violence perpetrated by 
the rich is invisible. In Brazil, the history of violence can be traced back to colonial times. It is 
violence exercised through the exploitation of black people, through oppression, and economic 
inequalities. Black people are still subject to these kinds of violence.” Comments like this con-
test discourses of black savagery, and were common among black police offi  cers, well aware of 
the pervasive racism of Brazilian history. However, the emancipatory potential of identifi cation 
between police and favela residents was in these cases stifl ed by the recourse to cultural expla-
nations that reconfi gured the latter’s poverty and marginalization as refl ecting fl aws of character 
or personal choice. In this regard, one offi  cer explained: “Th e hill is their world. It’s all they 
know . . . Th ey like to listen to their music, take their drugs, do nothing . . . Th e people that live 
here prefer the indecency (sacanada) . . . and they see our presence as an impediment.”
Th us, most UPP offi  cers saw residents as conniving with the traffi  ckers, reaping benefi ts 
from their criminal activity and leading an immoral life. During patrol, the moral character 
of policing was also expressed when offi  cers visited places that symbolized traffi  cker brutality 
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and, by association, that of the favela residents. On one such occasion, the offi  cers stopped at 
a cement cross that had been erected against a wall. One of them nodded at the cross: “Th is is 
where the traffi  ckers used to execute their victims, before the pacifi cation,” he said, contrasting 
their savagery with the alleged civility brought to the favela by the police—eff ectively ignoring 
numerous reports of police brutality at the UPPs. One of his colleagues interrupted him, adding 
with contempt:
Th e favela hasn’t been pacifi ed: People here are wrong! To them, what’s right is wrong! When 
I fi rst came here, I wanted to help out, I wanted to make a change. But now I have given up. 
I’m tired of the favela and the favelado [a derogatory term for favela residents] . . . I swear, 
when I leave the police, I will never set my foot in a favela again!
Th e other offi  cer agreed: “Th e favelado has no reason to complain. He chooses to live in a pile 
of rubbish because it’s cheap. He decides to live in the middle of the shootouts,” he explained, 
recasting structural inequality as a moral choice. Th en, referring to a 10-year-old boy who had 
been killed in a crossfi re between the police and traffi  ckers a few weeks earlier, he added: “Aft er-
ward, everybody complains when a child is killed . . . Damn, it’s a war! People are going to get 
killed!” He understood the police’s failure to bring peace to the favelas as a result of the moral 
shortcomings of favela residents and their inadequate support for the police, while police and 
state complicity in violence was rendered invisible. Police moralism thus justifi ed police vio-
lence, while favela residents—bad people—were seen to “get what they deserved.”
In these examples, pacifi cation implied a process of “civilizing” the symbolically black and 
savage spaces of the favelas, and specifi cally, the black male bodies associated with drug traf-
fi cking through racial profi ling, dress, and appearance (Figure 7). Th ese civilizing and mor-
alizing pretensions echo long-standing tropes of threatening black masculinity and sexuality, 
Figure 7: Young, black men from the favelas are disproportionally aff ected by mass incarceration 
and death, many at the hand of the police (© Tomas Salem).
100  Tomas Salem and Bjørn Enge Bertelsen
which has been seen to pose a danger to the project of white Brazilian modernity following the 
colonial era. Th ey are, for instance, expressed in nineteenth-century fears of slave revolts and 
experiments in whitening, such as mixed-marriage policies and sexual violence against women 
of color, the twentieth-century eugenics movement, and the ongoing urban reconfi gurations 
aimed at expelling black populations to the favelas and margins of the city (Holloway 1993; 
Meirelles and Athayde 2016; Nascimento 1989; Ystanes and Magalhães, this issue).
Th e police’s rare use of racially explicit language might partly be attributed to a foundational 
myth of racial democracy concealing the pervasive racism of the Brazilian state order—a myth 
oft en described as key to national political cosmology (see Nascimento 1989; Vargas 2004). 
However, it also refl ects the sociological proximity between police offi  cers and drug traffi  ckers: 
a large number of police offi  cers were young, black, and poor—many having grown up in the 
favelas. Furthermore, much like the traffi  ckers, UPP offi  cers asserted their authority through an 
ethics of masculinity predicated on the ostentation of weapons and displays of aggression (see 
Sørbøe, this issue; Robson 2014; Zaluar 2010). Th ese similarities demanded constant eff orts on 
behalf of the police to distance themselves from those they cast as their enemies (see also Fassin 
2013), creating diff erently racialized and gendered identities for themselves.
Police offi  cers would oft en share stories and information that highlighted the perceived 
immorality of favela residents and brutality of drug traffi  ckers. Th ese stories were contrasted 
with narratives of police heroism: of offi  cers who risked their lives for the greater good and 
acted as a liberating force in the favelas. Tellingly, one offi  cer recalled: “At the onset, it was very 
cool. We saw the change in the residents’ faces, right? Up until then, they were living under the 
uncertainty, under the lack of security . . . Suddenly another [drug] faction would invade [and] 
you’d have shootouts and such. Not to mention that they lived under the rules of the traffi  ckers.” 
In this account, favela residents were cast as subjects who needed to be saved, much like the 
missionaries’ understanding of indigenous Brazilians as subjects that needed to be baptized and 
converted to Christianity (Marinata 2008).
Similar religious sentiments were oft en made explicit in the police’s associations between 
Christian faith and the respect for police authority. In a comment on the nature of evil, one offi  -
cer suggested that criminals could be redeemed using the example of one former criminal who 
had become evangelical and, thus, a “good citizen” (cidadão de bem). Among police and favela 
residents alike, Christian faith was commonly an identity marker signaling honesty and moral 
superiority (see Cunha 2018). Crucially, the moral politics of Pentecostals and the Catholic 
Church were widely referred to and supported among offi  cers, and the police would sometimes 
describe themselves as carrying out God’s task in the favelas.
Th e goal of pacifi cation then, according to offi  cers, was to root out all reminiscence of “the 
culture of traffi  cking” and replace it with a state-sanctioned culture based on Christian con-
servatism and the idealized image of the heroic police offi  cer. In this regard, UPP social proj-
ects were also eff ective ways of enrolling people within a new moral state order, organizing 
and directing authorized forms of sociability in the favelas (see Gilsing, this issue). Th ese were 
largely directed toward young children and centered on attempting to replace the “negative” role 
model of the traffi  cker with the “positive” role model of the friendly cop. Arguing that children 
had to be targeted before they were swayed by the lifestyle of traffi  ckers, one offi  cer said: “We use 
to say that the problem starts when they are seven years old.” In a similar vein, another offi  cer 
noted the importance of the social projects as a way to produce a cultural change in the favelas: 
“If we stay here handing out beatings (porradas), detaining criminals, but without social proj-
ects [the pacifi cation won’t work].”
In April 2015, in response to increasing dissatisfaction with the UPPs among residents, the 
Military Police promised to ease up on the restrictions to arrange funk parties. However, when 
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asked if they were going to allow funk parties in Alemão, one offi  cer said: “Th ey say that in the 
newspapers, but we are the ones who decide here. Not even Jesus can go against us.” His answer 
is telling of how police offi  cers understood their role in the pacifi ed favelas. Another offi  cer was 
even more explicit: “Th e new owner of the hill (dono do morro) is the UPP!” Th e logic was clear: 
as “good people,” police offi  cers need only trust themselves to distinguish good from bad.
Emergent Police States
Drawing on a rhetoric of social inclusion, the UPP project promised to bridge the gap between 
favela and asfalto and bring peace and development to the former. However, as we have shown 
through the ethnographic examples here, the logic of pacifi cation accentuated the racialized 
inequalities of this division. Furthermore, it perpetuated the colonial and authoritarian dynam-
ics of policing through the subsuming of proximity policing to military-strategic aims and 
through the civilizing and moralizing pretensions of the police in pacifi ed favelas. Th e emerging 
state order at the UPPs rested, thus, less on the social inclusion of favela residents and more 
on their “peaceful submission” to a racialized state order that renders the conditions for life in 
the favelas all but impossible (see Neocleous 2013). In this sense then, the UPPs heralded the 
emergence of a multiplicity of small, authoritarian police states, scattered across Rio’s urban 
landscape (see Muniz and Albernaz 2017).
Importantly, by situating the UPPs within a broader historical context, we have highlighted 
the racial dynamics of police moralism and how the pacifi cation project, conceived as a proj-
ect exclusively for the favelas, reproduced a racial ordering of the urban landscape. While the 
UPPs were deemed unnecessary in the asfalto where residents already respected police author-
ity, Dennis Pauschinger’s contribution to this special section shows how state security poli-
cies implemented here were geared toward the production of racialized elite enclaves while 
ne cropolitical modes of governance were perpetuated in the favelas.
Th e moral order established by the police in the favelas echoes long-standing conservative, 
right-wing politics in Brazil and is integral to the same moral universe expressed by Bolson-
aro and the so-called Bancada BBB, a reactionary legislative caucus in the Brazilian congress. 
Th e three Bs stand for the alliance between rural sectors (boi—beef), fundamentalist Christians 
(bíblia—bible), and law enforcement and arms industry (bala—bullet). Patrol offi  cers at the 
UPPs widely ascribed to the right-wing moralism of the BBB caucus. Th ey defended a reac-
tionary, hierarchical moral order based on the respect for police authority: coupled with con-
servative Christian family values and gender and sexual traditionalism, these orientations were 
instrumental in Bolsonaro’s rise to power in 2019.
Th e Rise of Bolsonaro
In Achille Mbembe’s essay on necropolitics, the colony is described as “the site where sover-
eignty consists in the exercise of power outside the law . . . and where ‘peace’ is more likely to 
take on the face of a ‘war without end.’” Th e colony is, in Mbembe’s view, a modern formation 
characterized by a state of lawlessness, governed through a politics of death. Underpinning the 
distinction between colony and “civilized” state is the ordering of the world according to human 
races and the lawlessness that characterizes colonial formations “stems from the racial denial 
of any common bond between the conqueror and the native” (2003: 24). Fittingly, the concept 
of necropolitics has recently informed a timely critique of the lack of attention to racial aspects 
of urban violence in Rio and Brazil (e.g., Alves 2018; Saborio 2019). And as we have shown, 
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the UPPs not only reproduced the favelas as warzones but also implied a transformation in 
the exercise of colonial necropower in the favelas—precisely in Mbembe’s sense (see also Alves 
2018). Th rough the implementation of proximity policing, the emphasis slid toward the territo-
rializing and civilizing dimensions of colonial power, underlining, with the notion of the culture 
of traffi  cking, precisely the “racial denial of any common bond between the conqueror and the 
native.” Similarly, the inimical relation between the police and residents was reconfi gured, with 
the latter increasingly imagined both as (potential) allies in the police war against the cartels as 
well as vulnerable populations “at risk” of being swayed by the culture of traffi  cking (see Gress-
gård 2018). At the UPPs, therefore, increasing police involvement in favela sociability refl ects 
broader trends toward a reconfi guration of the social through the logic of security—including 
the merging of security politics with right-wing moralism and reactionary discourses on gen-
der, sexuality, and race.
Such connections should be unsurprising: as anthropological studies of violent, militarized, or 
weaponized settings from across the world have shown (e.g., Albrecht and Kyed 2015; Diphoorn 
and Grassiani 2018; Graham 2010), actual policing practices are inextricably linked to dynam-
ics of sovereign logics and hegemonic social orders (see also Fassin 2013). Th is includes, as we 
show, racialized understandings of the subjects to be policed supported by police moralism that 
is readily operationalized and deployed. While this is key to understanding the immediate con-
text of the policing in question and impinges directly on the practices of police offi  cers, we fi nd 
two additional components even more pertinent in the Brazilian case.
First, we note that within the Brazilian state order the favelas are seen (by the police agents 
and the wider society) as zones that need to be disciplined and tamed—again and again. Th ey 
thereby serve as internal colonies, inhabited by subjects that fall short of being full-fl edged cit-
izens—also because of their lack of moral orientation, as stated by several police offi  cers (see 
Gilsing, this issue; Vargas 2004). Th ese noncitizens are therefore exempt from ideals of citizen-
ship, participation, and, for that matter, a pacifi c police force. Th us, it is unsurprising that our 
material from Rio’s favelas demonstrates how policing as warfare continued to be central to also 
the UPP project. Concretely, this was tangibly present not just in the deployment of belliger-
ent forms of policing centered on territorial occupation but also through subsuming proximity 
policing to the military-strategic goal of winning allies—described by offi  cers as part of a “psy-
chological war” against traffi  ckers.
Th us, proximity policing should be understood neither as a strategy to secure the legitimacy 
of the pacifi cation project for a larger Brazilian (or international) public nor as merely an object 
within political discourses. Instead, it must be approached as a measure to eff ectively enact 
and establish an emergent, sometimes plural, state order within the so-called pacifi ed areas, 
by means that have a long trajectory in Latin America. While proximity policing drew on the 
rhetoric of human rights, social inclusion, and local democracy, the state order imposed by the 
police in the favelas was deeply moral and founded on conservative Christian ethics of decency 
and traditional masculinity. Furthermore, such assertion of police moralism built on respect for 
(state and police) authority and was asserted through gendered and racialized violence.
Th is also means the favelas were sites where forms of creeping authoritarianism were 
expressed, enacted, and, crucially, experimented with. Such experimentation refl ected similar 
dynamics on a national scale, as attempts at creating a socially inclusive democratic state order 
collapsed, fi rst with the reemergence of right-wing authoritarianism during President Michel 
Temer’s government (2016–2018) and next with the rise of Bolsonaro’s neofascist populism. 
Moreover, the limited infl uence that residents had on the policing of their communities, and the 
subordination of social politics to security politics made the emergent state orders of the UPPs 
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reminiscent of the military state of Brazil’s authoritarian past, while the civilizing dimensions 
of pacifi cation refl ected the larger patterns of colonial domination and structural racism char-
acteristic of Brazilian social order. As such, the material presented here challenges the image of 
Brazil sold to the international audience ahead of the 2016 Olympics: rather than being a beacon 
of modernity or an instantiation of a “racial democracy,” we show how the logics of a nascent 
Brazilian form of populist right-wing authoritarianism (with quite some structural similarities 
with other instances around the globe) were operative in the favelas during the years of the 
“pink tide” and the Workers’ Party governments (see also Gold and Zagato 2020).
Second, and this is an analytical point, as internal colonies and locations for experimentation 
with violent and less violent forms of police authority, the favelas became crucial sites that pre-
fi gured (see, e.g., Graeber 2007) the militarized approach that Bolsonaro later capitalized on. To 
be concrete, during Bolsonaro’s presidential campaign and aft er his victory in October 2018, his 
style of populist, right-wing authoritarianism actively drew on racialized imagery of the favelas’ 
degraded population. At one level, then, one can surmise that Bolsonaro’s bellicose rhetoric of 
cleansing and reasserting control refl ects a (global) populist impulse to steer clear of more dif-
fi cult issues related to economic decline, rising inequalities and democratic failure. As Wendy 
Hunter and Timothy Power (2019: 81) write in a recent comment, “Unleashing the police and 
even deploying the army in urban areas, which Temer has already done in Rio de Janeiro since 
February 2018, is a form of low-hanging fruit.” However, what we have shown in this text is 
that such a maneuver on the part of Bolsonaro is irreducible to a simple question of political 
opportunism: instead, it needs to be seen as predicated on deep-seated notions of racio-spatial 
division between asfalto and favelas on the one hand, and the reassertion of the latter as sites 
for experimentation with forms of necropower through the UPPs on the other. In this way, the 
favelas are, both under Bolsonaro’s presidency and in the campaign leading up to it, increasingly 
cast as the internal others to be policed and disciplined, especially concerning issues of morality. 
Bolsonaro’s state project draws actively on long-term racialized politics and discourses casting 
both black and poor as enemies and seeking to tame them into peaceful submission through a 
politics of death.
However, it is also fueled by a more recent powerful political force within Brazil, namely a 
neo-Pentecostal political cosmology of a post-democratic nation: as Matan Shapiro has shown, 
Bolsonaro understood early on the force of Pentecostal politics, and it is no coincidence that 
he let himself be baptized in the Jordan River in Israel in 2016, suggesting “his trip to Israel in 
2016 and . . . immersion in the water of the River Jordan can be read either as a mimetic attempt 
to become viscerally absorbed with a divine power (as a converging force) or as a marketing 
gimmick that would appeal to the huge Evangelical electorate in his ultimately successful 2018 
Presidential Campaign” (2019: 14). As in many other countries that have become infused with 
(neo-)Pentecostal ideational systems, the sociopolitical order—including styles of policing and 
the production of enemies—becomes sharper, divisive, and, sometimes, more violent (see, e.g., 
Rio et al. 2017). It should therefore not be a surprise that Bolsonaro’s moralism, which is also 
present within the UPPs, draws on a neo-Pentecostal cosmology in his bid to reestablish, in a 
neocolonial fashion, traditional racial and gendered hierarchies in Brazil. Th us, expanding the 
logic of operation in the favelas onto wider Brazilian society, Bolsonaro employs the state’s secu-
rity apparatuses to do so, by sanctioning violence against populations that resist this hierarchical 
ordering of the world.
Th e analytical implications of this relation between the dynamic in the favelas and the emer-
gence of Bolsonaro—which is not, of course, to imply a simple causal connection in a mechanis-
tic sense—provide a corrective to the argument that state violence in Brazil is a direct refl ection 
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only of economic inequalities—a form of template explanation for global populism that dis-
regards, for instance, colonial trajectories. To be clear, we are not suggesting that a focus on 
economic inequalities is unimportant but rather that by taking the racialized aspects of policing 
into account, we can further our understanding of why some favela subjectivities (i.e., those 
associated with the so-called culture of drug traffi  cking) are selectively targeted by the police. 
By examining the politics of race, we can also see the contours of totalitarian right-wing politics 
in Brazil and the (emergent or fully developed) police states these rely on, contribute to, or, in 
some cases, actively produce.
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  NOTES
 1. In Saad-Filho and Morais’s (2018) book, the paradoxes of modern Brazil, especially between the 
socially inclusive discourse of the Workers’ Party and its implementation of neoliberal economic 
policies, are examined. Also useful in understanding this apparent contradiction is Nancy Fraser’s 
(2019) elaboration on “progressive neoliberalism” in the United States.
 2. In Brazil, policing activities are divided between a wealth of state and non-state actors. Th e Federal 
Police enforces federal laws and patrols federal highways, while each state has its branches of Military 
Police, in charge of street patrol, and the Civil Police, responsible for investigations. Locally, Munic-
ipal Guards are also occupied in street-level policing. Additionally, policing activities are carried out 
by non-state agents and groups such as private security contractors, drug traffi  ckers, and militias. 
Oft en, off -duty, state-employed police offi  cers work as private guards, while the militias are com-
posed of discharged offi  cers, prison guards, and former military personnel. Th e boundaries between 
diff erent groups remain porous, opaque, and changing, and the policing assemblage in Rio can use-
fully be understood as an example of what Diphoorn and Grassiani (2018) call “security blurs.”
 3. As such, the UPPs were only the most recent and visible attempts to reform Brazilian police forces. 
Similar programs were rolled out in Rio in the decades following the return to democracy in 1984, 
and other big Brazilian cities implemented their community-oriented police reforms in the same 
period.
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